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Abstract
Consent to the process of European integration is contingent and the reproduction of 
consent is, in Renan’s (1882) terms, a ‘daily plebiscite’. Each new Treaty conveys a new 
understanding of what the EU is and ought to be. Analysis of the latest Treaty provisions, 
intended to bring Europe closer to the people and to address the democratic deficit,
demonstrates the extent and implications of competition over competence between the 
various actors involved. The resulting compromises are manifestations of Haas’s (1976) 
‘turbulence’ in practice and also contribute to further ‘turbulence’ by shaping 
understandings of what the role of the public and other actors within the EU system is 
and ought to be. Recognising the importance of cognition and contingent consent for the 
integration process, and the role of EU institutions in reproducing these, requires a 
rethink of existing approaches to European integration theory and a nuanced social-
psychology of the European Union.
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Too late ‘to dissolve the people and elect another’? Cognition, Contingent Consent 
and Turbulence in the Integration Process? 
After the uprising of the 17th June
The Secretary of the Writers Union
Had leaflets distributed in the Stalinallee
Stating that the people
Had forfeited the confidence of the government
And could win it back only
By redoubled efforts. Would it not be easier
In that case for the government
To dissolve the people
And elect another? (Bertolt Brecht, The Solution)
Introduction1:
The literature on the EU contains in almost equal measure: lamentation - over the lack of 
a European people and the implications of this for the emergence of a demos; and 
consternation - when the European people raises its voice in the rejection of various 
Treaties and the EU Constitution. The response to these rejections has involved: on the 
one hand, considerable scrambling around by national and EU elites to ‘fix the people’
and to finesse Treaty developments with minimum substantive change and maximum 
palatability; and, on the other, much head-scratching amongst academics attempting to 
understand why the supposedly non-existent, or ineffectual, people revolted and what this 
means for European integration. 
This paper examines the often neglected concept of consent to the functioning of the 
European Union. The contingent nature of consent and the importance of cognition in 
influencing the degree of consent to the process of European integration are examined.
                                                
1 A much earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop on ‘The Lisbon Treaty and the Future 
of the European Union’, 6-7 December 2007, University of Glasgow. I am grateful to participants in that 
workshop and to James Mitchell for insightful comments.3
The role played by the EU institutions in shaping the ‘appreciative systems’ (Vickers, 
1965) and ‘mental models’ (Denzau and North, 1994) through which calculations of the 
costs and benefits, on the basis of which consent is offered or withheld, is central to this 
analysis. Each new Treaty, it is argued, whether ratified or not, conveys to the public a 
new understanding of what the EU is and ought to be and of what the role of the public 
within the EU system is and ought to be. As Anderson et al (2005: 193) argue, 
‘[I]nstitutions make winners and losers and those two conditions imply very different sets 
of attitudes and behaviours for voters, not least of which is that they also create very 
different sets of attitudes towards the institutions themselves.’ To this extent a detailed 
examination of the Treaties, the processes through which they are agreed and 
implemented and the narrative which they contribute to in relation to the role of the 
various actors in the EU is crucial for any understanding of how consent is gained or lost 
in relation to the integration process.
As yet, there has been little attempt to understand how the processes, policies and 
institutions at the EU level not only reflect the changing role of the various actors 
involved, but shape the roles of those actors and reinforce expectations of what their role 
and the role of the EU is to be in the future. Yet these factors are central to any 
explanation of how and to what extent the EU is seen as legitimate, whether consent to 
the continuation of the process of European integration is granted and crucially as to 
whether ‘losers’ consent’ (Anderson et al, 2005) can be secured to ensure at least 
acquiescence to the continued functioning of the EU.
It is argued, along with Renan (1882), Deutsch (1969) and Levi (2001), that consent is 
contingent and that the reproduction of consent/affiliation is a ‘daily plebiscite’. 
However, perception of what is desirable or acceptable can change over time. Thus, the 
establishment of a ‘mental model’ (Denzau and North, 1994), which presents the solution 
to the legitimacy crisis of the EU and to each Treaty ratification debacle as that of 
bringing Europe ‘closer to the people’, has significant implications. Internalisation of this 
‘mental model’ generates a new understanding of the role and rights of ‘the people’ in 
relation to an EU which can no longer remain the preserve of the elites.  It is ironic that 4
attempts to bring the European Union, traditionally an elite run enterprise, ‘closer to the 
people’ and to enhance the legitimacy of the Union may, in fact, raise expectations about 
the ability of the EU to involve the people that cannot be met. Failing to meet its stated 
aims generates uncertainty and dissatisfaction and threatens the ability of the Union both 
to meet the demands of its expanded constituency (‘input legitimacy’) and to perform its 
traditional tasks efficiently and thus ensure at least a degree of ‘output legitimacy’
(Scharpf, 1999). In effect, the EU may be perceived by the public, as a result of its own 
efforts to legitimise its actions, to be less legitimate than it was to start with.
Cognition and Contingent Consent
Experience would thus suggest a general rule for integration. To be 
acceptable as a substitute for special group facilities – local, national, 
or even segregated ones – integrated facilities must usually be better 
facilities. International government and administration would have to 
be better than the national governments and the national 
administrations it would replace. And it would have to be better not 
just in the opinion of distant experts who arrive by airplane to check 
the accounting books but also in the experiences and emotions, in the 
feelings and daily lives of the populations directly concerned. No 
capabilities for such international government are now in sight. 
(Deutsch, 1969:171)
Edelman (1967), Vickers (1965) and Deutsch (1969) all recognised the crucial interplay 
between an individual’s pursuit of certain outcomes or benefits and the meanings and 
perceptions that determine the relative value of particular goals. This perspective has also 
informed the work of sophisticated institutionalists concerned to understand how beliefs 
are formed and how mental maps impact upon choices made (cf, Denzau & North, 1994; 
North, 2005) or how intangibles such as ‘fairness’ and ‘reciprocity’ enter into rational 
calculations of cost-benefit ratios (Levi, 1997). 5
In the 1960s Vickers developed the concept of ‘appreciative systems’ in an attempt to 
explain the interrelationship between calculations of cost and benefits and the values or 
appreciation placed on those benefits. He argued that cognitive elements, often implicit or 
unconscious, shaped the extent to which one course of action rather than another might 
be perceived as more desirable or acceptable to an individual than another. He argued, 
moreover, that such cognitive elements developed over time and through the process of 
collaboration and interaction. Thus, like Deutsch (1969), Vickers (1965) argued that 
experience and perception were crucial factors in the explanation of any calculation of 
the costs and benefits of action or inaction:
Appreciation manifests itself in the exercise through time of mutually related 
judgement of reality and value. These appreciative judgements reflect the view 
currently held by those who make them of their interests and responsibilities, views 
largely implicit  and unconscious which non the less condition what events and 
relations they will regard as relevant to them, and whether they will regard these as 
welcome or unwelcome, important, demanding or not demanding action or concern 
by them. Such judgements disclose what can best be described as a set of 
readinesses to distinguish some aspects of the situation rather than others and to 
classify and value these in this way rather than in that.’ (Vickers, 1965:67)
This approach finds a resonance in more recent attempts to understand the relationship 
between the competing conceptions of reality which underpin the various ‘mental 
models’ (Denzau and North, 1994) which help to shape decision structures: ‘As soon as 
we realise that we always have an imperfect grasp of ‘reality’ and frequently have 
contrasting and conflicting views of the human landscape, we can begin to get a handle 
on the process of human change. The process works as follows, the beliefs that humans 
hold determine the choices they make that, in turn, structure the changes in the human 
landscape.’ (North, 2005 :23).6
The importance of cognition becomes all the more central when the concept of consent is 
recognised to be contingent. The distinction between diffuse support for the continued 
functioning of a political system and specific support or consent for individual policies 
(Easton, 1975) has been recognised and linked to the overall issue of the legitimacy of the 
political system. Renan (1882) famously wrote that the very existence of the nation is a 
‘daily plebiscite’2. This is equally true in relation to a political system such as the EU.
Central to the generation of support for any given system is the perception of fairness. An 
individual can withhold specific consent for an unfavoured policy without withdrawing 
diffuse support for a system which may deliver his/her preferred policy next time round. 
Levi (2001), building on Beetham’s (1991) work on legitimacy, argues that individuals 
are willing to consent to obligations if it is felt that those obligations are evenly 
distributed and reciprocated by other citizens. However, she also warns that ‘…political 
obligation rests on the citizen’s perception that government actors and other citizens are 
trustworthy. The activation of obligation implies institutional arrangements that make 
promises and commitments credible, but it may also require extraordinary acts of 
compensation to overcome distrust based on past experience’ (Levi, 2001:208). New 
‘mental models’, which provoke new expectations on the part of EU citizens, may have 
significant long terms implications for the process of European integration if those 
expectations are not met.
Anderson et al’s (2005) discussion of the importance of ‘losers’ consent’ for the stability 
of a political system also raises important questions in relation to the interplay between 
the requirements of any given system and the support sustained amongst those who 
perceive themselves as losers under that system for its continuation. Short-term, or 
intermittent, periods as ‘losers’ are deemed acceptable within a stable system which is 
generally perceived to operate fairly. However, how institutions are structured, and the 
ways that the goals of the institutions are articulated, shapes who the winners and losers 
are and the extent to which the system is perceived as being fair. In the case of the EU, 
for example, the same individuals who may have been winners if ‘economic progress’ 
                                                
2 I have elsewhere explored the importance of insights from traditional theories of nationalism for 
understandings of the contingent nature of European identity (Cram, 2009a).7
was viewed as the central requirement of the EU, and this remained an elite process,
potentially become ‘losers’ if ‘democracy’ and ‘proximity to the people’ are used as a 
measure of the success of the EU.  However, now that the latter has been offered as a 
possibility, the lack of ‘democracy’ and ‘proximity to the people’ becomes perceived as 
‘unfair’ and the trustworthiness of the system comes into question, regardless of whether 
the EU is delivering the ‘economic progress’ it was set up to deliver or not.
A further issue for the EU in relation to Anderson et al’s (2005) discussion of losers’
consent, so essential to the continued functioning of the political system, is that the least 
likely systems to generate consent are those that are perceived as being unstable.
Ironically, as attempts to bring Europe ‘closer to the people’ continue to raise then dash 
expectations and feed further ‘turbulence’, the EU system becomes less stable and less 
likely to generate consent amongst the European people.
There is a complex interrelationship between cognitive and material elements in 
determining a given course of action. Deutsch (1969), as quoted above, argued that the 
processes of integration and devolution were the result of a cost-benefit analysis 
concerning the capacities of the integrated or devolved bodies but were also a reflection 
of the perception of the capacity of the bodies and the experience of those affected by 
them. From this perspective, a mutually reinforcing relationship exists between Treaty 
Provisions and the creation of the ‘mental models’ (Denzau and North, 1994) through 
which the provisions are created, put into practice through the policy process and 
experienced by recipients as well as the ‘mental models’ through which subsequent 
demands on the system are understood and articulated: ‘policy making assumes, 
expresses and helps to create a whole system of “human values”’ (Vickers, 1965:29). By 
altering the beliefs of significant groups as to their rights and roles within the EU system, 
a new measure of the credibility of trustworthiness of the EU comes into play. Thus,
incomplete efforts to democratise the EU in order to enhance the legitimacy of the EU 
system have, for example, very real consequences. When the logic of ‘contingent 
consent’ is taken into account, the contradictory provisions and messy compromises, 
evident in the analysis of the Treaty conducted below, are likely to contribute to the 8
generation of competing understandings of what is fair and what is acceptable in relations 
with the EU. To this extent, efforts to bring Europe ‘closer to the people’ have the 
potential not only to cause ‘turbulence’ and instability but also to undermine the very 
legitimacy which they sought to secure.
Bringing Europe Closer to the People: Turbulence in Practice
‘The condition of turbulence can be visualized as a giant simultaneous chess match over 
which the judges have lost control’ (Haas, 1976: 175)
The Nice Summit undertook to launch a debate on the ‘Future of Europe’. Both in the 
process of its conduct, which was to ‘encourage wide-ranging discussions with all 
interested parties: representatives of national parliaments and all those reflecting public 
opinion, namely political, economic and university circles, representatives of civil 
society, etc’  (Treaty of Nice (2000) Declaration 23, point 3), and with regard to the 
points for consideration, such as ‘how to establish and monitor a more precise 
delimitation of powers between the European Union and the Member States, reflecting 
the principle of subsidiarity’ and ‘the role of national parliaments in the European 
architecture’ (Treaty of Nice (2000) Declaration 23, point 5), the debate was to bring 
Europe ‘closer to the citizens’. Thus, ‘the Conference recognises the need to improve and 
to monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its institutions, 
in order to bring them closer to the citizens of the Member States’ (Treaty of Nice (2000) 
Declaration 23, point 6). 
In the ensuing Convention on the Future of Europe, charged with conducting this debate 
and with drafting the Constitutional Treaty, 30 members of national parliaments were 
formally included as members and for the first time the ‘civil dialogue’ was utilised in the 
preparation of an EU Treaty: ‘In order for the debate to be broadly based and involve all 
citizens, a Forum will be opened for organisations representing civil society (the social 
partners, the business world, non-governmental organisations, academia etc)’ (Laeken 9
Declaration, 15/12/2001:5). The convention was charged with considering how: ‘A better 
division and definition of competence in the European Union’ might be established and 
with addressing a series of questions relating to the role of national parliaments in the EU 
decision process (Laeken Declaration, 15/12/2001). The failed Constitutional Treaty
3
upgraded the Subsidiarity Protocol of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), substantially 
increasing the role of national parliaments in the monitoring process, and Article 1.47 
was entitled ‘The Principle of Participatory Democracy’ and specifically recognised the 
role of ‘regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’. The preamble 
to the Lisbon Treaty, Treaty on European Union (TEU), in turn, declares the need to 
enhance the ‘democratic and efficient functioning’ of the Union institutions. The role of 
national parliaments is further strengthened, with an 8 week period in which parliaments 
may raise an objection to an EU legislative act on the grounds of subsidiarity, and a 
commitment to consult civil society continues to be declared to be one of the ‘Democratic 
Principles’ of the EU (Title II, Lisbon Treaty on European Union, 13 December 2007). 
Evident in the debate since Nice, and in the various attempts to codify a set of 
instruments in Treaty format, has been a renewed focus on the issues of subsidiarity and 
proportionality with heavy emphasis on the issue of how competences should be 
allocated and defended at the various levels of the EU decision-making structure.  This 
has been closely related to the question of democratic oversight by the national 
parliaments and to some extent by regional and local parliaments and assemblies on the 
basis of the subsidiarity principle. Meanwhile, the issue of the democratic deficit has also 
been addressed by ensuring more routine involvement of wider civil society through a 
number of more direct mechanisms. 
In sections (i), (ii) and (iii) below,  the complex range of instruments, actors and 
processes in the Lisbon Treaty which aim to bring Europe ‘closer to its citizens’ are 
examined. It is argued that a two-pronged approach is evident. First, the Treaty 
strengthens channels of indirect or representative democracy: providing an increased 
                                                
3 The Constitutional Treaty, signed by Heads and State of Government on 29 October 2004, was rejected 
in referenda in France, on 29 May 2005, and in The Netherlands, on 1 June 2005.10
role for national parliaments and potentially for regional and local parliaments and 
assemblies.
4 In particular, the role of national parliaments has benefited from an 
increased oversight/scrutiny function at least in relation to the ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’ (or community method, as was) and, in particular, in relation to the 
monitoring of the subsidiarity provisions.
Secondly, evident in both the Treaty provisions and in daily policy practice is an 
increased role for ‘new modes of governance’ and for more ‘participatory’ forms of 
democracy. For example, there is repeated reference in the TFEU to the Commission’s 
right to take ‘any useful initiative’ to promote the coordination of member state actions in 
a wide range of areas which are formally areas of member state competence. This 
coordination approach is already being modelled on the existing OMC procedures in 
employment, social inclusion, health and pensions which encourage bench-marking, 
mutual learning and peer review. At the same time, civil dialogue has been 
institutionalised in the ‘Democratic Principles’ of the Treaty on European Union, thus 
potentially strengthening the formal involvement of civil society in the EU policy 
process.  Specific organisations such as the social partners have had their direct role in 
the EU social policy process further entrenched and the ‘Citizens Initiative’ formally 
creates a direct agenda-setting role for EU citizens.
(i) The Lisbon Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty signed by the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of 
the European Union on 13 December 2007 amends the Treaty on European Union (which 
retains its Title (TEU)) and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (which 
                                                
4 Although this will be subject to the interpretation of ‘where appropriate’. For example, in Protocol No2, 
Article 2: Commission consultation should ‘where appropriate take into account the regional and local 
dimension of the act envisaged’, while in Protocol No 2, Article 6: ‘It will be for each national Parliament 
or each chamber of a national parliament to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with 
legislative powers’ (emphasis added).11
becomes, under Lisbon, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). 
Broadly, the revised TEU deals with the fundamental institutional principles and goals 
guiding the EU, while the TFEU deals with the specific application of these principles in 
relation to specific policy areas. The two Treaties are accompanied by 37 Protocols, each 
of which shares the same force of law as the Treaties, and 65 Declarations which are 
considered to be expressions of political rather than legal commitment but which may be 
taken into account by the European Court of Justice. The Lisbon Treaty has not yet been 
ratified by all member states. On 12 June 2008 the Treaty was rejected in a referendum in 
Ireland. Meanwhile the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Sweden have yet to ratify 
the Treaty, although none of these require a referendum. 
The commitment to bringing Europe closer to its citizens remains a key stated goal of the 
Union in the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, the preamble to the Treaty on European Union  
‘RESOLVED to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity’. In the same Treaty, Title 1, Common Provisions, 
Article 1, it is stated that ‘This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an 
ever closer union among the people of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as 
possible and as closely as possible to the citizen’. Again, in Title II Provisions on 
Democratic Principles, Article 10: 3 it is declared that ‘Decisions shall be taken as openly 
and as closely as possible to the citizen’.
The principles of Conferral and Subsidiarity are laid out in the Common Provisions of the 
TEU (Title 1), Provisions on Democratic Principles of the TEU (Title II) details the role 
of both representative and more direct forms of participation in and scrutiny of the EU 
policy process and the Final Provisions of the TEU reinforce the importance of a clear 
delineation of competences and declare the possibility of decreasing the competences of 
the Union rather than simply increasing them.
5 Attempts to operationalise these broad 
commitments in relation to specific policy areas and the roles of the various actors and 
institutions are provided in the TFEU
                                                
5 See also Declaration No 18 Declaration in Relation to the Delimitation of Competence12
(ii) Treaty on European Union
(a) Provisions Relating to the Principles of Conferral and Subsidiarity
From the outset, the TEU stresses that competences belong to member states which may 
choose, or not, to confer the right to act upon the Union and its institutions. Thus, TEU 
Title I, Common Provisions, states: ‘By this Treaty, the HIGH CONTRACTING 
PARTIES establish among themselves a EUROPEAN UNION, hereinafter called "the 
Union" on which the Member States confer
6 competences to attain objectives they have 
in common.’ Also from the outset, the limitations on the Union activities in relation to the 
principle of conferral are established:  ‘The Union shall pursue its objectives by 
appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in 
the Treaties’ (TEU Title I, Common Provisions, Article 3:6). To this end, the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality are invoked: ‘The limits of Union competences are 
governed by the principle of conferral, ‘The use of Union competences is governed by 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’(TEU Title I, Common Provisions, 
Article 5:1).
Should there be any doubt about the principal of conferral, the statement that 
‘Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member 
States’ is repeated twice (TEU Title I, Common Provisions Articles 4:1 and 5:2).
7 Article 
5:3 (TEU Title I, Common Provisions), meanwhile, seeks to establish a measure of what 
constitutes reasonable justification for and limitation upon Union action in areas of 
shared competence: ‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within 
its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central 
level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’.
                                                
6 Emphasis added
7 And again in Declaration No 18. Declaration in relation to the delimitation of competences13
The Common Provisions of the TEU refer to the Protocol (No 2) on the Application of 
the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality and to the role of national parliaments 
in ensuring compliance with the subsidiarity principle. The Protocol provides that: ‘Any 
national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament may, within eight weeks 
from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, in the official languages of the 
Union, send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does 
not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. It will be for each national Parliament or 
each chamber of a national Parliament to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments 
with legislative powers’ (Protocol No 2, Article 6). Protocol No 2, thus, provides a 
procedure through which EU institutions, national and regional legislatures may 
operationalise the subsidiarity principle in relation to draft legislation. If one-third of all 
votes allocated to national parliaments raise objections, the draft legislation must be 
reviewed. These provisions undoubtedly represent an enhanced role for national 
parliaments, at least, in relation to the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (‘community 
method’ as was).
(b) Provisions Relating to Democracy and Civil Engagement
The provisions of the TEU in relation to democracy and civil engagement target a wide 
range of actors, emphasising different and potentially conflicting roles for the various 
bodies. TEU, Title II Provisions on Democratic Principles declares that the ‘functioning 
of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy’. The direct role of the 
European Parliament, in representing citizens at the European level (Article 10:2) is 
emphasised. In the same clause, the indirect representative role of members states, 
represented by their Heads of State or Government (in the European Council) or by their 
governments, and which are ‘democratically accountable either to their national 
Parliaments, or to their citizens’ (Article 10:2) is also stressed. Interestingly, an explicit 
role is allotted to ‘Political parties at European level’ in  ‘forming a European awareness 
and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the union’ (Article 10:4), although 14
no such mention is made of the role played by domestic political parties.
Title II, Provisions on Democratic Principles, of the TEU 
8 also address the role of 
broader ‘civil society’. The Union institutions are required to ‘give citizens and 
representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their 
views in all areas of Union action’ (Article11:1) and to ‘maintain an open, transparent 
and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’ (Article 11:2)  
The Commission, meanwhile, is charged with carrying out ‘broad consultations with 
parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent’ 
(Article 11:3). Additionally, a direct initiating role for citizens is introduced: ‘Not less 
than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States 
may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its 
powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a 
legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’ (Article 
11:4).
The role of national parliaments is specifically addressed in Article 12 of  TEU, Title II 
Provisions on Democratic Principles. National  Parliaments are said to ‘contribute to the 
good functioning of the Union’. Specifically, it is stated, in relation to Protocol No 1 On 
The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union  and Protocol No 2 On the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, that national 
parliaments play a key role: ‘through being informed by the institutions of the Union and 
having draft legislative acts of the Union forwarded to them in accordance with the 
Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union’ and ‘by seeing to it 
that the principle of subsidiarity is respected in accordance with the procedures provided 
for in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’ 
(Article, 12, a & b).
                                                
8 The Provisions of Article 11(clauses 1, 2 & 3) are identical to those which previously appeared in the 
Constitutional Treaty in Article 1:47 entitled ‘Participatory Democracy’. There have been some small 
changes to Article 4 on the Citizens’ Initiative.15
(iii) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
The TFEU seeks to establish a working legislative framework within which the broad 
principles identified in the TEU can be put into practice. The importance of the 
distribution of competences in the EU is established from the opening lines of the TFEU. 
Part One Principles Article 1:1, TFEU thus declares: ‘This Treaty organises the 
functioning of the Union and determines the areas of, delimitation of, and arrangements 
for exercising its competences’. The whole of Title I is, in turn, devoted to establishing
Categories and Areas of Union Competence.
In the TFEU, the starting point concerns not, however, the principal of conferral and thus 
the ability of the member states to limit the activities of the Union, but the degree to 
which the ‘exclusive competence’ of the Union limits the ability of the member states to 
act without the authority of the Union. Thus, ‘When the Treaties confer on the Union 
exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by 
the Union or for the implementation of Union acts’ (Title I, Categories and Areas of 
Union Competence Article 2:1). To this end Article 3 (clauses 1 and 2) details a series of 
areas in which the Union exercises exclusive competence.
9 It is also stated that: ‘The 
Union shall have competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on 
European Union, to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, 
including the progressive framing of a common defence policy’ (Article  2:4).
                                                
9 TFEU, Title I, Categories and Areas of Union Competence Article 3: 1: The Union shall have exclusive 
competence in the following areas: (a) customs union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market; (c) monetary policy for the Member States whose 
currency is the euro; (d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries 
policy; (e) common commercial policy. TFEU, Title I, Categories and Areas of Union Competence Article 
3: 2: The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement 
when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to 
exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.16
More problematic, however, are the areas of shared or mutual competence. These areas 
are central to the discussion of subsidiarity. As the UK House of Lords’ European Union 
Committee has noted: ‘The principle of subsidiarity only applies where the EU and the 
Member States have shared competence i.e. where both the EU and Member States can 
make the law. If the EU has exclusive competence in a matter, or none at all, then 
subsidiarity issues do not arise’ (HL Paper 101, 14 April 2005: 9).
Unsurprisingly, TFEU provisions relating to areas of shared competence are complex:
‘When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in 
a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding 
acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the 
Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their 
competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence’
(Title I, Categories and Areas of Union Competence Article 2:2). A detailed explanation 
of how this situation might manifest itself in practice is found in Declaration No 18  
Declaration in Relation to the Delimitation of Competences: ‘The latter situation arises 
when the relevant EU institutions decide to repeal a legislative act, in particular better to 
ensure constant respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The Council 
may, at the initiative of one or several of its members (representatives of Member States) 
and in accordance with Article 241 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, request the Commission to submit proposals for repealing a legislative act. The 
Conference welcomes the Commission's declaration that it will devote particular 
attention to these requests’. The limitations on the scope of shared competence are 
reinforced in the Protocol (No 25) On the Exercise of Shared Competence ‘With 
reference to Article 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on shared 
competence, when the Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise 
of competence only covers those elements governed by the Union act in question and 
therefore does not cover the whole area.’
Article 4:2 provides a list of areas in which the Union and Member States share 17
competence.
10 In addition, however, Article 4:1 states that: ‘The Union shall share 
competence with the Member States where the Treaties confer on it a competence which 
does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 3 and 6.’ Article 6 details a hybrid 
category in which competence is not shared but remains with member states but where: 
‘The Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States.’
11  The basis for this hybrid category is 
found in Article 2:2: 
In certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the Treaties, the Union 
shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement 
the actions of the Member States, without thereby superseding their competence 
in these areas.
Legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of the provisions of the 
Treaties relating to these areas shall not entail harmonisation of Member States' 
laws or regulations.
As a result, a number of these hybrid cases appear both within Title 1 and throughout 
the TFEU in relation to specific policy areas. Thus, in relation to economic and 
employment policies it is stated in Title 1, Article 2:3 that member states shall 
coordinate their activities ‘within arrangements as determined by this Treaty, which 
the Union shall have competence to provide’ and in the same title, it is stated that: 
‘The Member States shall coordinate their economic policies within the Union. To 
                                                
10 Title I, Categories and Areas of Union Competence’ Article 4:2:  Shared competence between the 
Union and the Member States applies in the following principal areas:(a) internal market; (b) social policy, 
for the aspects defined in this Treaty; (c) economic, social and territorial cohesion; (d) agriculture and 
fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; (e) environment; (f) consumer 
protection;(g) transport; (h) trans-European networks; (i) energy; (j) area of freedom, security and justice; 
(k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty.
11 The areas of such action shall, at European level, be: (a) protection and improvement of human health; 
(b) industry; (c) culture; (d) tourism; (e) education, vocational training, youth and sport; (f) civil protection; 
(g) administrative cooperation.18
this end, the Council shall adopt measures, in particular broad guidelines for these 
policies’ (Article 5:1). The areas of research, technological development and space 
(Article 4: 3) and development cooperation and humanitarian aid (Article 4: 4) also 
enjoy a specific mention in identically worded provisions: ‘the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities, in particular to define and implement programmes; 
however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being 
prevented from exercising theirs’. Similarly, the ‘Union may take initiatives to ensure 
coordination of Member States' social policies’ (Article 5:3).
Critical analysis of the application of these principles in the TFEU itself reveals how 
difficult it is to distinguish in practise between areas of ‘shared competence’ between the 
Union and the Member States and competence which is retained by member states but 
where the Union has the right to coordinate member state activities. This is important, not 
least, because Title 1, Article 2:6 states: ‘The scope of and arrangements for exercising 
the Union’s competences shall be determined by the provisions of the Treaties relating to 
each area’. 
One particular provision is utilised repeatedly in the TFEU in relation to a range 
of policy areas: 
The Commission may, in close contact with the Member States, take any 
useful initiative
12 to promote such coordination, in particular initiatives 
aiming at the establishment of guidelines and indicators, the organisation 
of exchange of best practice, and the preparation of the necessary 
elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation. The European 
Parliament shall be kept fully informed.
This precise wording is utilised in relation to: Public Health Title XIV, 168:2 (an area of 
shared competence under article 4:2 (k)); Industry Title XVII, 173:2 (an area excluded 
from shared competence under Article 4:1, due to its inclusion in Article 6(b)); and 
                                                
12 Emphasis added19
Research, Technological Development and Space, Title XIX, 181:2 (which enjoys a 
special hybrid status in Article 4: 3). Although the Article in Title 1 concerning 
Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation (Article 4:4) defines a special hybrid 
status for these areas which is worded identically to the provision for Research, 
Technological Development and Space, the wording of the specific Articles enacting this 
provision in the body of the TFEU is different. The Commission is also, however, 
allowed to employ ‘any useful initiative’ to promote the coordination of member state 
activities in Humanitarian Aid and development cooperation.
13 The same permission to 
utilise ‘any useful initiative’ is also applied to the area of Trans-European Networks in 
Title XVI, 171:2 although this is an area of ‘shared competence’ under Article 4:2(k). 
Finally, the case of social policy provides a useful example of the complexity of the 
provisions. TFEU Article 156 states that ‘the Commission shall encourage cooperation 
between the Member States and facilitate the coordination of their action in all social 
policy
14 fields under this Chapter’.
15 Article 156 continues: ‘To this end, the Commission 
shall act in close contact with Member States by making studies, delivering opinions and 
arranging consultations both on problems arising at national level and on those of 
concern to international organisations, in particular initiatives aiming at the establishment 
of guidelines and indicators, the organisation of exchange of best practice, and the 
preparation of the necessary elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation. The 
European Parliament shall be kept fully informed.’ In practice, however, social policy 
enjoys a very unclear status in Title 1, Categories and Areas of Union Competence. 
Under Title 1, employment policy is given a special mention: ‘The Union shall take 
measures to ensure coordination of the employment policies of the Member States, in 
particular by defining guidelines for these policies’ (Article 5:2), while vocational 
                                                
13 Development Cooperation, Title III, Chapter 1, 210:2 and Humanitarian Aid, Title III, Chapter 3, 4:6
14 emphasis added
15 Article 156 continues ‘particularly in matters relating to: –employment, – labour law and working 
conditions, – basic and advanced vocational training, – social security, – prevention of occupational 
accidents and diseases, – occupational hygiene, –  the right of association and collective bargaining 
between employers and workers.20
training is included in Article 6, detailing areas where member states retain competence 
but the Union may be allowed to act. Meanwhile, ‘social policy, for the aspects defined in 
this Treaty’ is listed under Article 4 (b) as an area of explicitly shared competence. 
Declaration No 31 of the TFEU, rather than clarifying the position, further complicates 
matters by stating: ‘The Conference confirms that the policies described in Article 156 
fall essentially within the competence of the Member States. Measures to provide 
encouragement and promote coordination to be taken at Union level in accordance with 
this Article shall be of a complementary nature. They shall serve to strengthen 
cooperation between Member States and not to harmonise national systems.’ This 
potentially attributes a hybrid status to ‘all social policy fields under this chapter’. It is 
not clear how this relates to those areas detailed in Title 1, Article 4 as areas in which 
competence is shared, and where according to Title 1, Article 2:2: ‘The Member States 
shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence.’
(iv) ‘Competence’: Contestation and Compromise
The degree to which any attempt to clarify the relative spheres of competence of the 
various actors in the EU system is controversial is evidenced by the need to state and 
restate the principle of conferral, to provide a full Title of the TFEU on Categories and 
Areas of Union Competence and to append three additional protocols and three 
declarations to the Treaties: Protocol (No 1) On the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union;  Protocol (No 2) On the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity 
and Proportionality; Protocol (No 25) On the Exercise of Shared Competence: and 
Declaration Nos 18, 24 and 31.
Extreme care is taken in the Treaties to stress that any transfer of competence to the 
Union need not be a one way process and that Union competence may be decreased as 
well as increased. The Final Provisions of the TEU in Article 48:2 state:  ‘The 
Government of any Member State, the European Parliament or the Commission may 
submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties. These proposals may, 21
inter alia, serve either to increase or to reduce the competences conferred on the Union in 
the Treaties’. This statement is further reinforced in Declaration No 18 Declaration in 
relation to the delimitation of competences: ‘the representatives of the governments of the 
Member States, meeting in an Intergovernmental Conference, in accordance with the 
ordinary revision procedure provided for in Article 48(2) to (5) of the Treaty on European 
Union, may decide to amend the Treaties upon which the Union is founded, including 
either to increase or to reduce the competences conferred on the Union in the said 
Treaties.’
It is also emphasised that the new provisions in the Treaties, allowing for the EU to 
acquire the status of a ‘legal personality’ and introducing simplified revision procedures 
for parts of the TFEU, should not be understood as an extension of the competences of 
the Union. To this end, it is stated in Declaration No.24, Declaration in relation to the 
new legal personality of the EU, that: ‘the fact that the EU has a legal personality will not 
in any way authorise the Union to legislate or act beyond the competences conferred 
upon it by Member States in the Treaties’. In the Final Provisions of the TEU, Article 
48:2, meanwhile, it is asserted that the simplified revision procedure for Part Three of the 
TFEU: ‘shall not increase the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties’.
Despite the many statements and assertions to the effect that competence may not be 
compromised, in practice the situation is highly complex. As became clear in the 
previous section, the issue of subsidiarity only arises where competence is shared 
between the Union and the member states. As also became clear, there are many more 
areas of de facto shared competence than those formally stated in the provisions of 
Lisbon Treaty. 
The dual approaches to bringing Europe ‘closer to the people’ evident in the Lisbon 
Treaty provisions are mutually incompatible and highlight the problem of ‘turbulence’ in 
practice.  It is in those areas where the Union enjoys least competence that ‘new modes of 
governance’ such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), with a particular focus on 
the wider inclusion of civil society, have begun to emerge. The Union’s ‘Europa’ web-22
site states, for example, that: ‘The open method of coordination takes place in areas 
which fall within the competence of the Member States’.
16  Similarly, the process of civil 
dialogue is most developed in areas in which the Union has traditionally lacked 
competence.17 The implications of such ‘new modes of governance’ in relation to 
democracy and subsidiarity are not, however, straightforward.  The direct participation of 
so-called civil society and the spread of ‘new modes of governance’ provides, in practice,
support for a more influential role for unelected supranational institutions, in particular 
the Commission (Deganis, 2006), than a focus on the principal of conferal might have 
predicted. This undermines the impact of the subsidiarity measures and the apparent 
extension of the oversight powers of national, regional and local parliaments and 
assemblies.
Turbulence and the Integration Process
Turbulence is a term we bestow on the confused and clashing perceptions of 
organizational actors which find themselves in a setting of great social complexity. The 
number of actors is very large. Each pursues a variety of objectives which are mutually 
incompatible; but each is also unsure of the trade-offs between the objectives. Each actor 
is tied into a network of interdependencies with other actors which are as confused as the 
first. Yet some of the objectives sought by each cannot be obtained without cooperation 
from others. A turbulent field, then, is a policy space in which this type of confusion 
dominates discussion and negotiation. It can be sub-national, national, regional, inter-
regional and global – and all at the same time. ..
…The questioning of older norms and values then accelerates and problem-solving 
machinery which had been accepted earlier falls into disuse. New organizations are then 
devised in large numbers in the attempt to cope; but they change form and purpose 
almost as fast as they are created. As old rules fall into disrepute the new rules lack 
                                                
16 http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/open_method_coordination_en.htm
17  For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon see Cram (2009b)23
legitimacy and efficacy and are soon discarded. Everything is ‘up for grabs’ (Haas, 1976: 
179)
It is clear that the Treaty provisions aimed to bring Europe ‘closer to the people’ bring 
with them as many problems as they do solutions. However, in the light of the earlier 
discussion in relation to the role of cognition in the delivery of contingent consent, the 
very suggestion that this is the resolution to the legitimacy crisis of the EU is in itself 
important. The evident contradictions notwithstanding, the Treaty provisions contribute 
to a narrative which states that for the EU to become more legitimate it must become 
more democratic and that closer involvement of, for example, civil society organisations 
and an expanded role for national parliaments, will make it more democratic and hence 
more legitimate.18
The representativeness of civil society organisations at EU level has been widely 
questioned, the focus in EU reform on democracy rather than legitimacy has been
criticised (Majone, 2005, 2006) and the ‘new modes of governance’ potentially 
undermine the principal of subsidiarity (Borras and Jacobsson, 2004: 198). Nevertheless, 
the impact of this narrative and of the ‘mental models’ which it informs should not be 
underestimated. There is an increasingly wide range of actors who believe that they have 
a key role to play in the EU policy process and a right to play this role (Cram, 2009), 
depriving them of this role would now have significant implications for the generation of 
consent for the functioning of the EU as a system.
The same process, whereby hopes have been raised by institutional processes and 
provisions but dashed in practice, has become evident in relation to the various attempts
to ratify the EU Constitution and, most recently, the Lisbon Reform Treaty. Increasingly, 
however, developments at the Treaty or Constitutional level, despite (or perhaps because 
of) the failings of the Treaties themselves, can be seen to have generated further demands 
from the public for the extension of a role to which they now feel entitled. This has 
                                                
18 I have discussed this narrative and it institutionalisation as an example of Morgan’s (1989) ‘fiction’ 
elsewhere (Cram, 2006a, 2006b).24
important implications for understandings of what is now perceived to be an acceptable 
role for the public in EU constitutional affairs.
It has become increasingly apparent that the process of European integration is not 
reducible to the occasional signing of Treaties by member states. National executives 
were forced to issue a Reform Treaty because the Constitutional Treaty, arguably 
reflecting the lowest common denominator bargain between member state preferences, 
which they had signed was rejected by the citizens of key member states. It is difficult, in 
this context, to argue that member state governments any longer, if they ever did, dictate 
the pace and direction of European integration. 
This situation raised fundamental questions, even ‘soul-searching’ (Hooghe and Marks,
2006) amongst scholars about the utility of the dominant theoretical approaches to the 
study of European integration. As the integration process has become what Haas (1970) 
described as ‘turbulent’, the utility of key theories of integration has been called into 
question. As EU citizens are increasingly politicised, domestic interests are impacted 
upon ever more explicitly by regional interests and the choice set of member state 
citizens has been dramatically expanded, it is increasingly unclear that national 
executives can continue their role as gate-keepers in the way that intergovernmentalists 
would have expected.  Schmitter (2005), has, meanwhile, discussed the current state of 
‘politicisation’ of European integration and the implications that this has for the utility of 
the neo-functionalist approach. He asks whether neo-functionalism may have exhausted 
itself: 
When citizens begin to pay attention to how the EU is affecting their daily 
lives, when political parties and large social movements begin to include 
‘Europe’ in their platforms, and when politicians begin to realise that there 
are votes to be won or lost by addressing policy issues at the regional 
level, the entire low profile strategy becomes much less viable. Discrete 
regional officials and invisible interest representatives, in league with 
national civil servants, can no longer monopolize the decision-making 
process in Brussels (known in Euro-speak as ‘comitology’). Integration 25
starts to generate ‘winners and losers’ within member states, and loses its 
perception of being an all winners game (Schmitter 2005:268)
Perhaps most important are the implications of the involvement of citizens in the process 
of constitutional change, most obviously in the ratification referenda for understandings 
of the political behaviour of EU citizens, As Hooghe and Marks (2008) point out, in their 
discussion of the importance of identity in shaping contestation over Europe, referenda 
have a long half-life. At the very least, the direct involvement of citizens in the 
constitutional processes of the European Union has generated a clear desire for more 
systematic involvement in these processes. A Financial Times/Harris poll FT poll (FT 17 
October 2007),  indicated that seventy-six per cent of Germans, seventy-five per cent of 
Britons, seventy-two per cent of Italians, sixty-five per cent of Spaniards and sixty-three 
per cent of French want a referendum on the reform treaty. Further, as Dehousse (2006: 
157) has argued, the referenda call into question the traditional understanding of citizens’ 
votes on EU issues as ‘second order elections’. The debates over the referenda reflected 
not only domestic policy concerns or, indeed, the ‘identity’ issues associated with
‘diffuse’ support but related to specific support for particular policies: ‘European citizens 
give clear evidence of their will to weigh in on the choices that are made’. 
Clearly, the traditional ‘integration by stealth’ (Majone, 2005) favoured by the 
EU institutions, particularly the European Commission, has become less and 
less sustainable as a greater degree of politicisation and more public oversight 
permeates the EU system. The return by member states to an amending Treaty 
and their retreat from the more ambitious attempt to establish a Constitutional 
status for the EU Treaties fits nicely with Majone’s (2006) suggestion that the 
EU should pare back its activities to deal with its core business and thus focus 
on enhancing its efficiency. However, it is not the fact that national executives 
have sought to return to the Reform Treaty, sloughing off the Constitutional
paraphernalia of anthems, flags and currency, that should most interest 
observers. It is the fact that member state governments were ever persuaded that 
a Constitution was feasible or desirable that should be a focus of study. How 26
member states reached a point where this shared ‘mental model’ was 
imaginable is worthy of detailed analysis as are the implications of this model 
for public perceptions of what is desirable and what is acceptable in relation to 
an EU system for which the consent of the public is increasingly required. Over 
the long term, this may help to ‘invent a people’ for the EU (cf Morgan,1989;
Cram 2006). In the short term, it contributes to ‘turbulence’ and increasing 
dissatisfaction: on the one hand, on the part of the people disappointed with the 
behaviour of the elites; and, on the other hand, on the part of the elites
discomfited by the insubordination of a traditionally quiescent people. 
Conclusion: Too late to dissolve the people and elect another?
It is no longer perceived to be acceptable that the EU be dominated by elites. The 
‘integration by stealth’ which formed the bedrock of neo-functionalism is not sustainable 
in a climate of increasing politicisation (Schmitter, 2005). The debacle over the 
Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Reform Treaty, meanwhile, confirmed once more 
that member states do not enjoy the control that they once had over the integration 
process (Marks and Hooghe, 2008).
Here it has been argued that consent to the process of European integration is contingent 
and the reproduction of consent is, in Renan’s (1882) terms, a ‘daily plebiscite’. Analysis 
of the latest Treaty provisions, intended to bring Europe ‘closer to the people’ and to 
address the democratic deficit, demonstrates the extent and implications of competition 
over competence between the various actors involved. The resulting compromises are 
manifestations of Haas’s (1976) ‘turbulence’ in practice and also contribute to further 
‘turbulence’ by shaping understandings of what the role of the public and other actors 
within the EU system is and ought to be. If institutions define the ‘boundaries of the 
possible’ (Majone, 1989:35), they do this, at least in part, by defining what is expected 
and consequently by influencing what is accepted.
The emerging narrative which underpins both Treaty provisions and policy practice in 
relation to the need to bring Europe ‘closer to the people’, influences the value placed on 27
different outcomes. Thus, the conditions upon which the cost-benefit calculations (on the 
basis of which contingent consent to the process of European integration is achieved) are 
made are altered. This narrative may have significant implications for the integration 
process over the long term by ‘inventing the people’ for the EU (cf Morgan, 1989, Cram, 
2006). In the meantime, however, it is likely to contribute to the acceleration of what 
Haas (1976) has described as ‘turbulence’ in the integration process. 
Recognising the role of cognition and contingent consent, as well as of the wider range of 
relevant actors in the integration process, requires a radical rethink of existing approaches 
to European integration theory. To understand the mechanisms through which Treaties, 
policy practice and EU institutions as structures and as actors define understandings of 
what the EU is and ought to be and of the role of the public within it, a nuanced social-
psychology of the European Union and of how its institutions influence political 
behaviour is required. Not least this might forewarn Treaty makers about the long-term 
consequences of short-term compromises. With no clear agreement as to who the 
managers ought to be at the EU level, the task, so critical for any regime, of managing 
expectations becomes daily more challenging in the EU context.28
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